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a system of dual capitals in imitation of Tang China. Except for the five years between 740 and 745, when the court moved from Nara to Kuni, the dual capitals were Nara and Naniwa. The system came to an end with the move to Nagaoka in 784. On these capitals, see Hall 1974. 6 Ryo no gige, p. 301. Scholars know little of the physical plan of the Nara markets. Each market probably occupied four lots (tsubo tf), perhaps totaling twelve acres apiece, and was surrounded by a wall. In 1976, archaeologists of the Nara National Cultural Properties Research Institute excavated a small portion of the area believed to contain the Eastern Market. In addition to postholes for dwellings and illegible wooden tablets, the excavators discovered a canal that flowed into the Saho 1ftf river, a transportation artery in the eighth century. For geographical and archaeological information on the location and size of the two official markets, see Machida 1986, pp. 100-102. On the Eastern Market, see Heijokyo hakkutsu, pp. 8-9. The Western Market has also been excavated, but to little avail. See Heijokyo nishi.
7 Sakaehara 1987, p. 310 . The modern definition of multipurpose currency is any commodity that serves the threefold function of medium of exchange, store of wealth, and unit of account. Coinage may, depending upon the economic system, serve all or some combination of these roles.
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Greater secretary (dai sakan ikJX), Shihi no Genson HIJ_LiTfi (735). 11.208 This document omits many details about the transaction, including the medium of exchange and the price. Perhaps the most striking aspect of the above order is that Ryukyu jade was available in Nara. The identity of any traders who may have provided the jade to purchasing agents is unknown.
While the use of coinage and the publication of prices every ten days reduced transaction and information costs, available evidence suggests that official trade centers often may not have been the most economical places to shop. In one example, a government office calculated the value of hemp cloth owed it by a certain Kawamura i1t1 according to prices charged at the Nara markets, the selfsame Kawamura complaining all the while that the price was "extremely dear." In another case from 762, a major government bureau did much of its shopping for cloth, brushes, paper, and other utensils within its own premises and avoided the Nara markets. Similar cases appear repeatedly in documents from the eighth century, and may indicate that the official markets pegged prices considerably above what was available elsewhere.9
Fortunately for those with leisure and the wherewithal to shop, markets at Nara and other early Japanese capitals did not operate in isolation. They were, in fact, part of a much larger network that stretched throughout the Kinai and ultimately reached every province in Japan.'0 In the capital region itself water transport was the heart of the network (see map). From Nara, a shipper could send his goods down the Saho S4k river to the Yamato and follow that river to the port of Naniwa CA, where he might transship and sail the Inland Sea as far as northern Kyushu and the port of Dazaifu RWh. Or a shipper might haul his goods north by land to Izumi 7A on the Kizu *K$ and then float them via the Kizu and Yodo at rivers to Naniwa. Also important was the passage to Lake Biwa and the north, which was reached from Nara by following the Kizu to its confluence with the Uji fi4 river.
Engineers supplemented these natural arteries. Numerous roads were built to link the political and economic centers of the Kinai. Three major roads tied Nara to the former capital at Fujiwara 1 and two went west from the Yamato region to Naniwa. Other roads led to imperial retreats at Yoshino #f, Hora %P, and Shigaraki , and to the capitals of Izumi, Kawachi, Kii, and Omi provinces, each of which was also served by waterways.
With this fine system of natural and man-made routes and the sustained demand of a large official class (estimated eight to ten thousand), it is little wonder that the capital region developed into Japan's most active commercial 8 Dai Nihon komonjo, vol. 1, For the Kawamura example, see Dai Nihon komonjo, vol. 24, p. 560. The 762 case comes from Yoshida 1983, pp. 322-24 . On this point, also note Yoshida 1983, pp. 293-95 and 330-31. 10 Sakaehara 1972b, pp. 22-29. FARRIS: Trade, Money, and Merchants in Nara Japan Since the above record states that the lumber was to be hauled from Izumi to Nara, one may infer that these pieces were prepared in camps north of the capital in Omi, Iga, or Yamashiro. Later examples show that wood usually moved along the Uji and Kizu rivers to Izumi, and thence to Nara.13 While information about the overall pattern of prices in the Kinai trade is fragmentary, available documents show buyers paying attention to price differences. For instance, in the following record, Nukatabe Tsukushi MEH Ajl* at the Office for the Construction of Todaiji (zo-Todaijishi AIAikJ) researched before he bought:
Item: Charcoal to be bought Concerning the above, investigation of the price of charcoal at the Eastern and Western Markets (tozai no sumi no atai o heisho suru ni RTI ri '{fh) shows that it is still advantageous to buy at the Western Market. Be aware of this point and buy there....
[Tenpyohoji RT]
5(761).11.9
Report of Nukatabe Tsukushi14
Comparison shopping may not have been feasible for most commoners, but government ministries and large aristocratic households kept price lists. They also maintained branch offices (sho AE) throughout the Kinai, where on occasion they were able to find better terms. Documents from the immense Office for the Construction of Todaiji, which was formed around 745 and operated for nearly a half century, indicate that officials frequently "investigated prices," relying upon messengers (koekishi 44f) or trading posts to try to fill their needs in the most satisfactory way.15
Regional trade networks. Outside the Kinai, trade and markets were much less important. Coins were not accepted readily, and rice sheaves, which served as "near-money" in the well-known provincial and district financial system (suiko sei ffi*$1J), were the chief unit of account.16 Evidence for the various parts of Japan is too scanty to piece together a detailed picture of regional division of labor or levels of productivity, but it appears that the volume of commerce was greater in western Japan, especially the Inland Sea littoral and northern Kyushu, than in eastern Honshu. As with exchange in the Kinai subsystem, regional transactions took place in two settings: official and unofficial markets. Gazetteers (fudoki JA?`2) mention a few examples of local trade fairs, such as this one in the Ou $4 district of Izumo.
[In this area] hot water comes forth from the bank of a river. The place where the spring bubbles up has beautiful mountains and a seashore. Men and women, young and old, travel either by road or along the coast, and meet daily to set up a market. 17 Unofficial local markets like this one may have been held at places where people gathered to fish or take the waters. Yoshida Takashi believes, however, that these fairs probably were scattered about the countryside and opened for business only infrequently.18 Much more evidence has survived regarding the official markets near provincial headquarters. The documentation we have on Nara-period markets in provincial headquarters suggests that they were miniatures of the official markets at Nara. The Yoro Code ordered the organization of provincial markets by product and the establishment of official prices, just as it specified for the Eastern and Western Markets. The provincial governor was responsible for the proper operation of the market. Historical geographers indicate that provincial markets were generally situated south of the provincial office, again as at Nara. Because, as with the Nara markets, those near the provincial headquarters generally benefited from ready access to roads and rivers and the presence of a resident consumer class, most historians argue that official markets were more important than the sparse and infrequent fairs.19 310 Monumenta Nipponica 53:3 Japanese historical geographers and archaeologists have located the seats of many provincial and district governments and have discovered that nearby place-names still in use often contain the word "market." In Bizen the placename Kokufu Ichiba MTff11TJ (Market of the Provincial Capital) is still used, while in Mutsu, the name Ichikawa TJII (Market River) identifies a place close by the old provincial capital. Sakaehara Towao q7E, has uncovered twenty-three similar cases, stretching from the Kanto to Kyushu.20 Of course, there is no guarantee that these place-names date back to the eighth century, as many provincial headquarters survived well into the medieval era.
Some provincial markets seem to have been active centers of commerce. The Suo market, for example, lay on the continental trade route and was probably a busy place.21 An excavation of the area thought to cover the SuO capital was begun in 1961, and after four years of digging, excavators had retrieved many Nara-era artifacts and reconstructed much of the early landscape. The capital was a square of about one thousand meters on each side (see figure 1) . Near the center, within their own walls, were the provincial offices of the governor and his staff. At the southern end was a market served by a canal that led to the adjacent Inland Sea. The provincial capital also maintained docks on Tatara Ik PA beach, near the market, which suggests its importance for traffic to and from the Asian continent. In addition, Suo was the headquarters for the Nara Office of the Mint (chuisenshi i# 1P),, also undoubtedly important in continental trade.
Another Medium-and long-distance trade. The third category of Nara commerce linked the capital to the provinces. Because the law codes required each province to submit a variety of products to the capital as tribute, most interregional trade was in government commodities, as in the Bizen-Bingo tax trade mentioned earlier. Even isolated Sagami possessed a link to the central trade web.25 In 749, its governor ordered the construction of special offices and warehouses (mitsuki no yashiki =Rnp ) next to the Eastern Market in Nara, for the storage of local items that could be traded for textiles and other wares specified as tribute taxes. Goods unavailable in Sagami were probably also acquired and sent back home. Officials were logical candidates to conduct such transactions, since their home province had few merchants and tax items comprised the main trade merchandise.
Indeed, government officials appear frequently as handlers of interregional exchange. In 845, for example, officials of Mino province presented a case to the Council of State (daijokan tlEtQ').26 According to the governor of Mino, local officials in such eastern and northeastern provinces as Mutsu and Dewa were privileged to use state-authorized horses and porters to transport certain medicines, seaweed (konbu Rnfl), and other specialized products to the capital. But in addition, officials loaded "private goods without limit" onto these ship-313 ments. While in this case the goods and purpose of the shipment are not specified, local officials, according to Sakaehara Towao, aimed to trade their private caches for a handsome profit.27
Eastern Japan was not the only region engaged in long-distance trade. Dazaifu in northern Kyushu was under constant surveillance for illegal trade activities. The law codes prohibited all provincial governors from trading within their jurisdiction in items other than food and clothing. During a major smallpox epidemic in 736, the court specifically reiterated to Dazaifu officials that they could trade only for necessities, presumably to prevent them from taking unfair advantage of the crisis.28 The same prohibition was repeated in 754, and in 783 the Council of State condemned those officials at Dazaifu who so overloaded government tax barges with "private goods" that they sank.29 Later laws make it clear that officials continued to "come and go and do busi-
In sum, data presented so far suggest that the eighth-century economy was "multicentered," i.e., there were several overlapping transactional spheres with different media of exchange.31 While standing markets were important in the Kinai, even there the supply-demand market mechanism was peripheral, as indicated by the central role of in-kind taxes and the numerous political restrictions affecting official markets. Markets were even more marginal in the hinterlands, where the overwhelming majority of the populace subsisted with little regard for trade or copper cash as a medium of exchange. Tying the center to various localities was interregional commerce, where bureaucrats played a key role as the agents of trade. One working hypothesis is that the government encouraged the official class to perform vital mercantile functions because of the relatively undeveloped state of the Nara economy.
Money
An overview of metallic currency in the eighth century further highlights the entrepreneurial abilities and aspirations of Nara officialdom, both collectively and individually. Indeed, the entire plan for government minting was driven by desires to conserve material resources and increase the court's proportion of Japan's wealth. Unfortunately for the aristocracy, the very profitability of the mint conspired with other factors to undermine the stability of the money supply, eventually leading to inflation. The following section will focus primarily on copper coins, with some attention also paid to silver.32 27 Sakaehara 1972b, p. 57. For another example of lower-ranking officials acting as traders of cloth (tani A.tit) 32 Currency in Nara Japan was complex. In addition to copper coins, silver coins and bullion, gold coins, and cloth all comprised media of exchange. Gold coins, however, were minted for Silver bullion probably circulated in the capital region as early as the seventh century, indicating a use for metallic money in the most advanced region of Japan before the adoption of Chinese-style institutions.33 In 708, when the court decided to mint copper coins, it also called for the striking of silver coins, a few of which have been excavated.34 The government, however, soon abandoned silver currency for three economic reasons. First, in the early eighth century silver was in short supply. It seems likely that its commodity value was higher than the face value of the coins, reducing the advantages of minting from the perspective of the government. Second, counterfeiters mixed small portions of silver with base metals, and in a good example of Gresham's law, the bad currency soon drove out the good. Third, denominations of governmentminted silver coins were too large for everyday transactions.
The court consequently stopped minting silver coins and turned to copper ones. In 708, only two months after the abortive attempt to mint silver, the court decided to strike the famous Wado kaichin 5fMU [AVJ copper coins, which became an important form of money in much of central Japan. Their use presumably served to reduce transaction costs, and it is likely that they were issued not just in imitation of China, but also out of recognition of the potential of copper currency to facilitate and expand trade, as well as to draw goods into central coffers.
It was no accident that the government decided to mint copper coins as it was moving the capital from Fujiwara to Nara. While the relocation took place in 710, discussions about the move dated back to 707. Furthermore, transfer of the capital was officially announced only one month after the discovery of sizable deposits of copper in Musashi early in 708. This happy event provided a means of paying for the colossal new capital at Nara without frittering away in-kind revenues. The solution was to circulate copper coins, using them to pay for labor and materials. Once adopted, the policy of recompensing workers with copper coins was maintained for the duration of the eighth century.35
To have the coins accepted by workers was another matter. Therefore, the court took three steps in 711 and 712 to encourage circulation.36 First, it doled out official stipends in cash. Second, it issued a law allowing those who stored the coins to turn their holdings over to the government in return for ranks. Third, people were given the option of paying labor services (yo J*; zoyo *11) only a brief period by Fujiwara no Nakamaro ; and little evidence survives on the use of silk cloth.
Rice grain and sheaves were used as units of account by district and provincial governments in sharecropping arrangements (suiko), but because of the grain's perishability, it could not perform all the functions of metallic money. I prefer to defer consideration of this form of "nearmoney" to a later date.
33 On silver, see lyanaga 1980, pp. 388-426; Sakaehara 1991b, pp. 347-49; and Yoshida 1988, pp. 172-73. 34 Kidder 1972 , pp. 24-32. 35 Sakaehara 1972a , pp. 4-7, and Sakaehara 1991b , pp. 349-50. 36 Sakaehara 1991b and the local-products tax in coins in the Kinai and vicinity. Documents from 726 and 733 specified that nine coins satisfied the local-products tax and 120 the corvee.37 These various policies encouraged the circulation of copper coins in the Kinai subsystem, even if the process was somewhat artificial.38 Evidence on the scale of circulation in the early and mid-eighth century is unavailable, but a regulation preserved in a legal compendium provides a rough guide for the late 700s.39 The order begins by condemning "functionaries and people" outside the Kinai for hoarding rather using the coins, and specifies that these non-Kinai residents should return their cash to the government. (On hoarding, see below.) The last line adds an important proviso by excusing those living in "Iga, Omi, Wakasa, Tanba, and Kii" from complying with the new rule. The order does not give a reason for exempting the five provinces, but possibly coins were actually used in these areas, unlike the rest of the country. In support of such an inference, one may note that the five provinces bordered on the Kinai and were often the scene of provisioning activities for the capital elite. Moreover, four of these five provinces along with Echizen, Ise, Owari, and Harima were authorized to pay their local-products tax in cash. 40 Whatever the precise extent of cash circulation, the court soon became enamored of its mint for one simple reason: it was profitable. The face value of the copper coins was set far in excess of the commodity value of copper. According to Kida Shinroku , EE FrV/,, one measure (kin f)) of copper cost anywhere from 36 to 54 coins in 734 prices, but could be used to strike 180 coins.41 To be sure, there were other costs in minting besides the copper, but there can be little doubt that Nara officialdom was reaping a sizable profit at its mints.
Cash in which the nominal value is set far above the commodity value is common in premodern societies, and has been dubbed "token money"" by Carlo Cipolla.42 Such token money will hold its nominal value only if the money supply remains constant, assuming, of course, no major political upheavals, famines, epidemics, etc. Two phenomena, however, led to a decline in the value of coins in Nara Japan. First, counterfeiting became rampant.43 Scholars know that counterfeiting was a serious problem because 1) the legal 37 These records may be found in Nara ibun, vol. 1, pp. 135-94. 38 Bohannon and Dalton 1965, p. 15 , note that one use for coins is as a means of noncommercial payment and that such use is often confused with the broader definition of medium of exchange. The circulation of cash in this way may often make an economy look more "modern"-i.e., more commercialized-than it actually was. Sakaehara 1984, pp. 322-27, emphasizes this interpretation. A similar "artificial" circulation was achieved in the late Byzantine Empire.
39 Ruijui sandai kyaku, pp. 600-601; Enryaku 17 (798).9.23. 40 Sakaehara 1991b , p. 358. 41 Kida 1933 . 42 Cipolla 1956, p. 29; see also Friedman 1960 , pp. 5-9. 43 Sakaehara 1991b Yoshida 1988, pp. 173-75. penalties were stiff, 2) counterfeiters were usually omitted from amnesty declarations, and 3) an order issued in 760 claimed that half the coins in circulation were counterfeit.44 The other force that led to a decline in value was an increase in the money supply. Minting copper was so profitable that the government decided to open another mint in 735.45 As more coins were minted, they began to lose their value and inflation commenced. The first signs of this problem date back to 721 and 722, when the court tried to fix the value of copper coins in relation to silver. But the attempts themselves indicate the size of the problem. In 721, the exchange rate was set at one ryi Tk of silver to 100 copper coins. One year later, the conversion rate was changed to one ryo to 200 coins, suggesting that the government's initial effort to hold the line at 1: 100 had been overly ambitious.46
In the meantime, another development hindered the court's efforts to maintain the value of the coins. Between 735 and 737, a smallpox epidemic ravaged the islands; one estimate is that somewhere between one-quarter and one-third of the populace lost their lives.47 As with the Black Death in medieval Europe, the pestilence encouraged inflation in the near term because of shortages and problems in the systems of production and distribution. It is no accident that commodity prices show an increase at this time. 48 Following the inflation of the late 730s and early 740s, prices held steady or retreated slightly until the late 750s. Stagnation was the product of countervailing forces. On the one hand, there was reduced long-run demand after the great loss of population (another parallel to late-fourteenth-century Europe). On the other, as tax receipts dwindled, government officials decided to put more coins into circulation to pay for goods and services. Shoku Nihongi h H 4Z,td (Chronicles of Japan, Continued), the court annal of the Nara period, notes the beginning of a new stage in reliance upon the financial skills of government officials in an entry for the year 744:
Because the office buildings at the new palace of Shigaraki have not yet been completed, government cash in the amount of one thousand strings was allocated to each office, to be loaned out at interest. Repayments will be used to meet govemnment expenses. Do not permit reduction of the principal to pay for state projects. By the eleventh month of each year record these transactions, and report to the Council of State.49
The state now authorized usury to compensate for the shortfall in commodity taxes. secretary (sakan tA) in the Office for the Construction of Todaiji with a rank of senior sixth, upper grade, lent an underling named Manda Chitari tERf2FYX four hundred copper coins on the 30th day of the 2nd month in 773, taking Manda's summer clothing (natsu no ifuku AA U) as collateral. According to the loan contract, Manda received the loan for three months at 15 percent interest per month. The loan was repaid with interest on the 26th day of the 5th month.50 Such loans of copper cash were probably also common in the late 740s and 750s.
Apparently they did not raise sufficient revenue, because in 760 the chief powerbroker at court, Fujiwara no Nakamaro 1 decided on a new policy. His idea was to have the government mint another issue, called Mannen tsaho 7J56 1, to pay for public works. The attempt ran into trouble, however, as the government's desire for greater profits led it to declare that the new currency should circulate at ten times the face value of the old. Inflation rose sharply and remained high.51 Then in 765, the government tried to issue another coin (called Jingu kaiho pegged at ten times the value of the 760 issue. At the same time, the mint was shrinking the size of coins and their copper content.52 The currency situation became increasingly chaotic.
This confusion helps to explain a phenomenon often observed by archaeologists, the existence of large hoards of currency.53 Given the absence of banks in the eighth century, some stockpiles probably indicated stores of wealth. Local notables might accumulate large sums with the aim of buying rank. Some stores may have been the result of fascination with the coins themselves. And other hoards probably were a response to the uncertain economic times of the late eighth century; as with the silver coins earlier, people would tend to hold onto pristine Wado kaichin coins and use the debased later issues.54 Most official condemnations of hoarding date from the late eighth century.
Prices continued to spiral in the 770s. In 779, the government finally decided to allow both old and new issues to circulate at the same value. The court struck another copper coin in 796, and minted six more in the ninth century and two more in the tenth. Each time the coins decreased in size and copper content as a financially strapped government tried to make a profit.
Eventually, a reversion to exchange in commodities occurred. edict stated that even "Yamashiro peasants use rice sheaves in payment when buying and selling paddy fields."55 Workers hired for the few official construction projects of the ninth century were usually paid in rice. Although the reasons for the reversion to commodity exchange are undoubtedly related to changes in agriculture, land-holding, and the overall economy, one should not discount the role played by repeated debasements. Kozo Yamamura has noted that during the sixteenth century, when secular deflation was the rule, political leaders desired tax collection in currency over commodities because of the enhanced value of the cash.56 In the tenth century the opposite may have been the case, as the excess of debased copper coins reduced their purchasing power and encouraged a return to in-kind payments.
As with many aspects of the seemingly unsuccessful adoption of Chinesestyle systems in Japan, however, one should not look upon the experiment with copper cash as a failure. For most of the eighth century, the minting of copper cash helped to fill government coffers and pay for many major building projects. These coins were commonly used in business deals provisioning the capital elite, reducing transaction costs and making tidy profits for many in official positions.57 Nara Officials as Traders So far, this discussion of markets and money has provided indirect arguments and a few examples concerning the role of government officials as entrepreneurs. But just who were the agents linking wealthy consumers to various goods and services? Can scholars pinpoint more accurately the identity of these merchants? Evidence on Nara traders derives from three sources: comparative analysis of Chinese and Japanese law, anecdotes about private merchants, and documentary cases of dealers in action.
Tang vs. Nara Law. The Chinese codes made a sharp distinction between occupational categories and explicitly separated artisans and merchants from scholar-officials. The Household Statutes (huling; Jp. koryo )fI9) of a Tang code dating from 624 states:
Those who study civil and military affairs are scholar-officials. Those who expend effort in plowing and tending mulberry trees are peasants. Those who make goods and exchange them are artisans. Those who are butchers and winesellers and traffic in goods are merchants.
(Artisans and merchants in all cases mean someone who passes down his enterprise in his family to seek profit....) 55 Ruiju kokushi, p. 447. 56 Yamamura 1988, pp. 351-52. 57 Sakaehara 1972a, p. 20, lists seventeen examples of land transfers using coins in the eighth-century Kinai. Even after 800, coins continued to circulate, albeit at a greatly reduced value. For example, in thirty-two of eighty-nine cases of land transfer between 781 and 980 the transaction was denominated in coins, although it is unclear whether the purchaser really paid in cash (p. 3).
Houses of artisans and merchants cannot be scholar-officials. Stipend-receiving persons must not take advantage of the inferior man's profit.58
When the Japanese court wrote law codes based, on Chinese models, it appears that they initially incorporated the same principle. The idea was first given legal force in Japan in the Taiho 1ti Code of 701. An unknown legal specialist who wrote a commentary (koki i-N`) around 730, when the Taiho Code was still in effect, cites the following fragment from the Household Statutes:
Those who make goods and exchange them are artisans. Those who are butchers and wine-sellers and traffic in goods are merchants. ...59
As the scholar does not name the code from which he drew the statute, it is possible that he was referring to Chinese law. More likely, however, he meant the Taiho Code, since it was the law of the land when he was writing. Indeed, Yoshida Takashi argues that the fragment quoted above was an actual part of a statute found in the Taiho Code.60
If, indeed, the fragment is from the Taiho Code, then it probably is part of a complete four-status formulation, because 1) Japanese legislators usually borrowed most of a relevant Chinese law; 2) the law would make little sense if it included only artisans and merchants; and 3) the commentator indicated that a person's occupation was noted in government-compiled household registers.
The Taiho Code was Japan's first complete edition of Chinese law (i.e., including both penal and administrative statutes), but it was not the last. Only sixteen years later, in 717, Nara legal scholars rewrote the code under the auspices of Fujiwara no Fuhito E>TJt~L, naming their work from its date of compilation, the Yoro Code. This code, which did not go into effect until 757, has survived to the present almost intact. Notably, the Household Statutes of the Yoro Code contain no provision delineating four classes.
Why was this article included in the Taiho Code but deleted from the YOrO Code just sixteen years later? The omission might have been an error, of course, but that seems highly unlikely. Historians of the Nara period generally believe, judging from the many fragments of the Taih6 Code discovered in records of all kinds, that authors of the Yoro Code made only a few minor "cosmetic" changes in the Taiho Code.61 As deletion of an entire article is more than a slight change, one may conclude that the article was omitted for a specific reason. One possible reason is that by 717 it had become clear to legal scholars at court that Tang occupational categories were in some way inapplicable to Nara society. The class structures of Nara Japan and Tang China undoubtedly differed greatly. Because Japan was a younger society with a much smaller population, it seems likely that the division of labor within Nara society was much less elaborate than that of Tang China. Perhaps some Nara producers also served as peddlers of their goods, rendering the distinction between artisans and merchants meaningless. Another plausible reason for the deletion of this article is that in Japan private merchants and artisans were so insignificant that they were not conceived as categories to be identified.
Earlier, a working hypothesis accounting for the seminal role of bureaucrats as merchants in Nara Japan was proposed. To elaborate, there is little question that the level of economic development was much higher in Tang China than in the eighth-century archipelago. The private merchants who provided a wide variety of economic functions in China were likely not so common or powerful in Japan. In a word, the relatively undeveloped nature of the Nara economy may well have required the services of government officials to stimulate trading and money flow.
A comparison of the conception and behavior of officialdom in Tang China and Nara Japan lends support to this hypothesis. Consider the following article from the Tang codes, found in the Miscellaneous Statutes (zaling; Jp. zoryo t Imperial princes, dukes, and officials shall not dispatch their official staff or household slaves to open a stall at the market and carry on business, nor shall they sell or make loans in their residences or shops. If, however, they dispatch a person to another place, conduct business, and give the proceeds to their family without turning a profit, the activity does not fall within the aforementioned restrictions.62 The Tang statute adheres strictly to the spirit of the functional separation of official and merchant by outlawing bureaucrats of all ranks from manipulating markets for profit.
The analogous law from the Miscellaneous Statutes of the Yoro Code tells a different story:
Imperial princes and officials of the fifth court rank and above shall not dispatch their attendants (chodai OVN; shijin *X) or household slaves (kenin *X; nuhi QY. 0,) to establish a stall in the market and carry on business. However, activities such as selling at an unofficial market, making loans (suiko), or sending a person to another place to trade and come back, do not fall within the aforementioned restrictions.63 Whereas all officials were prohibited by Tang law, in Japan only the 120 officials holding the fifth rank and above were banned by this statute from engaging directly in business, and even they were given considerable freedom to partici-62 Niida 1964, p. 127. The earliest date for a Tang code containing this article is 737. 63 Ryo no gige, p. 338. 321 pate indirectly in trade outside the official markets. In 729, an imperial edict relaxed official restrictions even further by permitting those of the outer fifth rank, perhaps sixty people at that time, to do business. To use the Tang phrasing, Japan's lower-ranking scholar-officials did not just "study civil and military affairs," but could also "traffic in goods." An important institutional constraint operative in Tang China had been removed by Japanese legislators, who were evidently more concerned to promote commerce than to prohibit official manipulation of the market for private gain.
To be sure, the evidence presented above is fragmentary, but so are most data for the eighth century. Then, too, it requires the assumption that the law codes reflected a good measure of social reality. It is difficult, however, to conceive of any other reason why Japanese legal scholars would revise the particulars of the model Chinese statutes. Fortunately, historians need not rely on legal evidence alone.
Private merchants. Sources occasionally mention non-official traders. Shoku Nihongi contains two well-known examples. The first records that accomplices of Emperor Junnin 44:I, banished to Awaji, avoided detection by enemies D6kyO WA$ and Emperor Shotoku t4{A by disguising themselves as merchants (shonin A,k), a term Yoshida Takashi takes to refer to wandering peddlers.64 Although evidently such traders were common or insignificant enough not to have drawn notice, it seems highly unlikely that they could have supplied the Nara elite by themselves.
Another reference to private traders occurs in an entry dated early 744 in Shoku Nihongi. At the time, Sh6mu WiV and his officials were conducting government at Kuni 1 in the hills north of Nara, which they had vacated at the end of 740. Shomu was considering returning to a previous capital, possibly Naniwa or Nara. Three high-ranking courtiers were sent to the Kuni markets to ask non-official merchants (ichibito) their preference. According to the chronicle, all but two of an unknown number queried requested to stay put at Kuni.65 So we may infer that there were commercial marketers. In the end, however, their wishes carried little weight. The emperor ignored their advice and moved to Naniwa and then Shigaraki for a few months before eventually returning to Nara in the summer of 745.
Continuing archaeological work suggests that future discoveries may add to scholarly knowledge about independent merchants. For example, a wooden tablet uncovered at Nara in 1983 gives a tantalizing glimpse of a merchant in action: (Front): Low-quality silk stall-tender (ichikura bito *%A) counting trade cash (koeki sen R.,) at the Eastern Market ( The context for Hatoribe's dealings is unclear, but one interpretation is that he was stringing together copper coins he had acquired after selling some rough silk (ashiginu %i) from his stall.
Despite this interesting find, and the possibility that future work will lead to a different assessment, evidence of private commercial activities continues to be sparse. Of course, one can argue that private merchants simply did not leave records, and in the absence of documents there is no way of knowing how large non-governmental commerce may have bulked in overall dealings. Yet taken together with the legal evidence offered above and data on the noncirculation of copper coins in most of Japan, it seems doubtful that private merchants comprised a significant class, or played a major part in provisioning Nara. In the case of traders, as with warriors, the distinction between "private" and "public" was vague in the eighth century; reliance on this analytic tool obscures rather than enhances one's vision.67 Documentary cases. Then who were the chief handlers of trade? Yoshida Takashi has advanced a plausible and provocative hypothesis to answer this question.68 In a period when the wealthiest consumers were officials, when most trade goods were tax items, and when markets and transport were mainly government-sponsored, the most prominent merchants, he argues, were subordinate officials. Such an interpretation fits the legal evidence described above and helps to explain the dearth of references to other entrepreneurs.
Various factors gave lower-ranking bureaucrats both the means and incentives to be traders. Indeed, their positions compelled them to trade by generating excessive quantities of certain taxes-in-kind and stipends-in-goods. Specifically, the government assigned all ranked officials biennial stipends consisting of silk cloth, iron hoes, and, after the move to Nara, copper coins. High-ranking courtiers also received tribute income (rice, cloth, fish, iron, salt, etc.) from sustenance households (fuko 1t)'F). As the recipients of products that they needed to convert to a preferred mix of consumption goods, officials frequently had no choice but to engage in trade.
As noted in the Miscellaneous Statute cited above, however, institutional and cultural constraints discouraged direct involvement in business dealings for the elite at the fifth rank and above. High-ranking courtiers, consequently, needed to find someone whom they could trust to arrange transactions in their interests. To solve this problem, it would appear, they turned to their underlings in the bureaucracy, often members of the same faction.
That choice seems plausible because many uncertainties surrounded business dealing, and it was possible to minimize them by operating through lower officials. Enforcement costs could be reduced by employing lower-ranking officials to consummate a deal; if the underling took unfair advantage of the opportunity, his superior could readily avenge the misdeed. Douglass North has noted a similar situation with the commenda in medieval Europe, where kin were used in long-distance trade because they were more trustworthy than strangers.69 Even so, opportunities to turn an easy profit must have awaited low-level functionaries almost daily because they were charged with the responsibility of carrying out construction orders at the capital. In the eighth century, the government constructed six capitals and many official temples, including Todaiji. Aristocrats erected innumerable mansions. Immense quantities of lumber, stone, metal, cloth, labor, and provisions were needed to build and decorate these structures. Lower-ranking officials were well placed to take advantage of their circumstances.
Provincial officials were just as well situated as their counterparts in the capital to engage in trade. In fact, as noted above, their positions required them to do so. The Statutes on Tribute and Corvee (buyakuryo HR{?+) specified that provincial officials were to use tax rice and hemp cloth to acquire a long list of "rare and wonderful things," such as furs, jewels, precious metals, and dyes for forwarding to the capital.70 Thus, provincial financial reports (shozeicho IE 5W1t) show numerous governors trading rice for a multitude of products, including the Izumi governor's exchange for sue FW pottery in 737.71 In fairness, however, one should note that this trade amounted to only about 5 percent of total provincial expenditures.
Given the scale of construction and elite provisioning activity, no other group in Nara society had means and incentives that matched those of the bureaucrat. Although the identity of traders is rarely known, evidence from the law codes and court histories strongly suggests that many officials routinely engaged in trade. Records in the Shosoin give us our fullest glimpse of official trade and the men who handled it. The following examples are drawn from two areas of activity: temple construction and sutra transcription.
From 759 to 760, the government was busy endowing the Nara Buddhist community with a new holy structure, the Golden Hall at the nunnery Hokkeji IL .72 Hokkeji was located next to the imperial residences at Nara on land that had once belonged to Fujiwara no Fuhito. In 741 Komyo 5RW, consort of Emperor Shomu and a Fujiwara herself, had contributed the land to build Hokkeji as the nunnery for the official temple (kokubunji N5'#) of Yamato province (Todaiji). After the nunnery's completion, Komyo prayed for the construction of the Golden Hall and lent her considerable financial resources to the project. 69 North 1990, pp. 120-21. 70 Ryo no gige, p. 126; Hayakawa 1965, pp. 232-35. 71 See Sakaehara 1972b, p. 48, for several examples. See Nara ibun, vol. 1, p. 205, for the Izumi case. The 5 percent figure also comes from Sakaehara 1972b. 72 The Hokkeji record was first reconstructed by Fukuyama 1943, pp. 356-64. In the same work Fukuyama also reconstructed the Ishiyamadera documents.
Komyo's economic support for the construction of the Golden Hall came from donations of tribute goods, including products made by her personal sustenance households, a resource of all Nara consorts.73 The goods included cloth, cash, rice, and many other items, but not all were used directly by builders of the hall. Many donations, cloth in particular, were traded for copper cash, which was then used to purchase materials and pay workers. Exchange of cloth for cash took place at two locations. One was the construction site, where buyers from all over the capital region could "search out" (heisho ?TV) a good price, making comparisons with those at the Nara markets. Altogether 301.875 strings of cash were raised in this manner, about 18 percent of the total expenditure for the hall.
Trade in cloth also occurred at a second place, a site noted in the records simply as "Tanba's residence." The identity of Tanba is uncertain, but Yoshida Takashi proposes that "Tanba's residence" meant the grounds of Tanba no Hironari flACM, the chief financial officer of the Division of Lumbering and Carpentry of the Office for the Construction of Todaiji (the government ministry overseeing the erection of the Golden Hall and most other religious building in the Kinai). In the recorded instance, Tanba paid exactly four hundred strings of cash for the cloth, which suggests that he bought in large quantity to sell again to other buyers.74 This interpretation is bolstered by the abbreviated references to Tanba's purchases in government reports. While officials building the Golden Hall sold goods for cash to Tanba and other purchasers at the construction site, it is worth noting that they did practically no business at the Eastern and Western Markets, even though the markets were located just a few blocks from where the construction was proceeding.
In 761, about a year and a half after the Golden Hall was completed, the court initiated yet another building project. This was Ishiyamadera WELL, a temple situated in Omi province some thirty kilometers north of the capital. Construction went on at Ishiyamadera for almost two years, overseen by the same agency that supervised the work at Hokkeji. The raising of Ishiyamadera did not progress nearly so smoothly as that of the Golden Hall. In particular, provisioning the work force was a problem. On the 23rd of the 3rd month of 762, after several years of bad harvests, officials at Ishiyamadera wrote that "rice has run out and the workers have quit."75 73 Dai Nihon komonjo, vol. 16, pp. 282-83. These points are all recorded in the final financial report of the Office for Building the Hokkeji Golden Hall.
74 Yoshida 1983, pp. 312-18. 75 Dai Nihon komonjo, vol. 15, p. 174 . Ishiyamadera lay at the foot of Lake Biwa, a good distance from Nara, and its lumber camps were especially isolated. Moreover, the late 750s and early 760s were years of poor harvests in the Kinai. By the 3rd month of 762, it had become difficult to find adequate supplies of rice. The construction office assigned some revenue sources to officials at the site, but collecting the rice was another matter. Peasants of nearby Echi kt district in Omi were directed time and again to supply grain to workers and officials at Ishiyamadera, but they apparently resisted.
One method employed to provision the struggling project was borrowing from officials.76 In the spring of 762, for example, the temple borrowed at least 16.9 koku of rice from a certain Ato no Sukune Otari l a minor official with the rank of senior eighth, upper grade who maintained a residence at Seta -h. Otari is famous among historians of the Nara period because his life reads like a novel depicting the most turbulent decades of the eighth century.77
As agricultural conditions improved after the spring of 762, the builders of Ishiyamadera repaid Otari for his loan. But that was not the only way they expressed their appreciation to him. That fall, Inabe no Hiramushi M6 Rup, another official residing at Seta, was allocated at least four strings of cash and was sent to buy some brown rice, soya beans, and azuki beans. Because he was buying at harvest time, the supply was plentiful and prices were low. Much of his purchase went to the temple, but a record from the spring of 763 reveals that a good portion was also loaned to Ato no Otari. Just as in 762, the spring of 763 saw prices of farm products climb as supplies ran out, but Otari had promised to repay at autumn prices.78 If he used the beans and rice himself, Otari was saved a large expense; if he sold the items to others, he probably made a sizable profit.
Otari did not deal only in rice. Lumber was another commodity needed to build Ishiyamadera. The lumber camp for the temple was in northwest Omi province at Takashima A , deep in the mountains. When lumbering crews cut 273 pieces of Japanese cedar (sugikure tftf) for the eastern pagoda of the temple, they were also ordered to cut twenty pieces for Otari and ship them to his residence at Seta. About six months later in the fall of 762 when Ishiyamadera was nearing completion, Otari had the unused lumber (about 1,316 pieces, including his twenty), floated down the Uji river and back up the Kizu to Izumi. Furthermore, he eventually sold his private stock of 249 pieces, along with about 600 originally destined for the eastern pagoda, marketing 76 Yoshida 1983, pp. 302-11. During these lean years, the construction office used a variety of tactics to keep the project going. It sent units of local militia to Echi to extract grain, with some effect. The famous monk Roben A donated the harvest from certain temple lands to feed Ishiyamadera's workers, but that supply was insufficient. Purchases were made, yet because the whole region was afflicted with bad harvests, quantities were still inadequate. Laborers even forewent their rice wine to conserve grain.
77 Kishi 1966, pp. 324-28 . From 748 to 753, Otari served as a chamberlain (toneri -A) and was involved in the construction of Todaiji and the transcription of sutras. From 754 to 758, he was a secretary (shisho t,*) at Echizen province and assisted in the formation of Todaiji's estates there. From 758 to 764, he worked as a secretary (sakan Et&) for the Office for the Construction of Todaiji and was dispatched to help at the Hokkeji Golden Hall and Ishiyamadera. Evidence suggests that Otari was a member of the clique of Fujiwara no Nakamaro, the leading courtier at Nara from 756 to 764, and his disappearance from the record in 764, the year Nakamaro made an unsuccessful coup attempt, certainly reinforces that impression. During his glory years, however, his name appears again and again in the Shosoin documents. Other transcriptions for Otari's name include I7qJ1 YN, PqJ)UJ>XNZ.
78 Dai Nihon komonjo, vol. 16, p. 386; Yoshida 1983, pp. 307-309. A. Lumber Surplus lumber from Ishiyamadera construction 447 pieces Surplus lumber from the eastern pagoda 620 pieces Otari's lumber 249 pieces
Total lumber 1,316 pieces B. Transactions for the eastern pagoda lumber Price for lumber at Takashima 6 coins x 600 pieces = 3,600 coins Shipping cost, Takashima to Izumi 8 coins x 600 pieces = 4,800 coins Price for lumber at Izumi 24 coins x 600 pieces = 14,400 coins Profit 14,400-(4,800+3,600) = 6,000 coins them at Izumi, where the price for good lumber was four times what he paid at Takashima. With logging costs of six coins per piece and shipping costs from Takashima to Izumi of eight coins per piece, at a sale price of 24 apiece the profit margin was about 70 percent (see figure 2) .7 Nara merchant-officials did not always fare so well. After the work at Ishiyamadera was finished, the court ordered that a new religious project be started, the copying of a Buddhist sutra, the Daihannya JK)Ut scripture, onto fine paper by expert calligraphers. To finance the work, the Agency of Sutra Transcription (shakyosho 9#Pfi,, a section of the Office for the Construction of Todaiji) received a large allotment of tax cloth from the Treasury Ministry. Officials at the agency were commanded to trade this cloth for cash, which could then be used to meet various expenses.
These officials took the cloth on consignment from the agency, which required them to trade it at a minimal price. Early in 763, Otari's assistant, Jitaka no Sokutari PR reported his progress as follows:
I respectfully request your disposal of this matter.
Allotment of cloth: 30 units (ren A) (Previously specified selling price: 65 coins per ton 1iV. Price received: 60 coins per ton.)
Total received: 14 strings of cash Concerning the above, I know I should send the amount specified in your previous order. I sent a man to another province to trade, but he was incapable, and sold the cloth at a loss. I cannot bear to reflect on this. If you would accept the amount I received, I would be deeply grateful. When the rice of my newly cleared field has ripened, I will pay you the remainder as we originally agreed.
79 Yoshida 1983, pp. 309-11. 327
Details follow by word of my messenger. I cannot be more dependent on your good will. I bow and beg your decision. Making a profit involved risk-taking, and litaka's risk was not well calculated. In fact, in the outcome Otari disallowed Jitaka's request and a month later collected nearly another five strings from his unfortunate underling. The appearance here of Ato no Otari as Jitaka's superior confirms the impression of Otari's economic power. Until archaeologists uncover more tablets and other data, the social character of Nara traders will remain a matter of scholarly debate. The textual evidence now at hand, however, supports Yoshida's hypothesis. Many "scholar-officials" did not just practice learning, they were merchants as well.
Conclusion
Provisioning the aristocracy of eighth-century Nara was a complicated task. While it is reasonable to emphasize the elite's direct consumption of commodity revenues, as most studies do, one should by no means neglect the role played by traders and markets in satisfying the court's needs and wants. The documentary record suggests that the functioning of the Nara economy cannot be adequately explained without taking the market into account.
The chief handlers of eighth-century commerce were most likely lowerranking bureaucrats, a hypothesis suggested by information on trade patterns, currency, and various business transactions. In the country-wide exchange network, trader-bureaucrats seem to have been most active in Kinai and interregional transactions, a tendency that reflected varying levels of development and productivity throughout the islands. The government's primary motives in minting copper cash were to conserve material resources and increase revenues; such a policy proved highly profitable until the excessive growth of the money supply and other factors eventuated a reversion to in-kind consumption bundles after 800.
An examination of several business transactions indicates that low-level functionaries made good traders because 1) they had the goods to exchange, and 2) they were the most trustworthy agents available to the higher levels of the aristocracy. Lower information costs may also have been a factor for officials engaged in medium-and long-distance exchange. To accommodate 80 Dai Nihon komonjo, vol. 16, . On this record, also see Yokota 1963 and Ito 1948. Yoshida and Ito agree that litaka was a jushi WH-, a lowly attendant in the imperial quarters. On jushi, see Heijokyui mokkan, pp. 94-95. Despite litaka's use of his private harvest to compensate for his failed venture, there can be no doubt that the letter details an official venture. See Yoshida 1983, pp. 319-20. 
